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Abstract
This paper considers the micro-econometric analysis of patients’ hospital
choice for elective medical procedures when their choice set is pre-selected
by a general practitioner (GP). GPs have a dual role with regard to elective
referrals in the English NHS, advising patients and at the same time taking
account of the financial implications of referral decisions on local health bud-
gets. The paper proposes a two-stage choice model that encompasses both
patient and GP level optimization. It demonstrates that estimators that do
not take account of strategic pre-selection of choice sets may be biased and
inconsistent. We find that GPs as patients’ agents select choice options based
on quality, but as agents of health authorities also consider financial implica-
tions of referrals. When considering these choice options, patients focus on
tangible hospital attributes, like amenities.
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1 Introduction
In conventional discrete choice analysis, e.g. conditional logit (McFadden (1974))
and its variants, choice sets are assumed to be exogenous. In choice situations in-
volving credence goods an “expert” agent with arguably superior information strate-
gically presents a set of pre-selected choice alternatives to a principal decision maker.
These pre-selected choice sets are endogenous. Choice of National Health Service
(NHS) funded hospital services in England is an important case in point: legislation
in the mid 2000s gave patients free choice of hospital for elective medical procedures,
but choice is implemented by a referral from the patient’s general practitioner (GP)
who is mandated to offer patients a set of choice alternatives.1 This paper discusses
the design and estimation of a choice model for the patient / GP decision process
and identifies biases in estimation when the potential endogeneity of choice sets is
ignored in the econometric model that forms the basis of analysis.
UK legislation (Department of Health (2004)) mandated that, from 2006, pa-
tients be given choice among 5 hospital, and from 2008 patients’ hospital choice was
entirely unrestricted. For common elective procedures, like hip replacements, pa-
tients have several hundred choice alternatives. For most patients, in the role of the
principal beneficiary of the choice outcome, such a choice problem is intractable.
They typically exercise their choice following discussions with a GP who advises
on their choice as a medical expert. Patients need a GP referral to access elective
care, and medical expertise places the GP in the role of the gatekeeper who narrows
the patient’s choice problem down to a more manageable set of pre-selected choice
alternatives.
GPs arguably possess superior information about salient attributes of the set
of conceivable choice alternatives, notably with regard to the quality of medical
1See the National Health Service Commissioning Board and Clinical Commis-
sioning Groups (Responsibilities and Standing Rules) Regulations 2012, available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2012/2996/part/8/made
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treatment at a given hospital. Hospital quality is multi-dimensional and notoriously
difficult to assess (Gowrisankaran and Town (1999), Gutacker et al. (2016)). In light
of such information asymmetries, patients tend to defer to GPs’ medical expertise,
both when it comes to the need for treatment and the assessment of treatment qual-
ity at hospitals.2 But GPs, to some extent, are also agents for hospitals and health
authorities more generally. In 2011/12, the period of our study, local healthcare
budgets were controlled by Primary Care Trusts (PCTs).3 These budgets for the
cost of care for the local population were fixed annually, and hospitals were paid
a fixed price per referral. So the costs of referrals by GPs fall on the fixed budget
of the PCT to which the GP belongs. This raises the question of whether GPs
internalize these costs.4
Consequently, when pre-selecting sets of choice alternatives for patients, GPs
may face a conflict of interest which induces a misalignment of their incentives with
patients’ incentives. This wedge driven between the GP’s and patients’ incentives
renders choice sets endogenous.
Choice analysis with limited choice-sets has been considered by McFadden (1977)
who offers two conditions - positive and uniform conditioning, characterizing an
exogenous selection mechanism - that are sufficient to yield consistent estimates in
the presence of exogenously limited choice sets; Santos et al. (2013) refer to this
result as justification for the consistency of their maximum likelihood estimator with
imposed choice sets that are subsets of the true choice sets.
The literature on general econometric choice models that allow for endogenous
choice sets is still relatively sparse. The choice modelling literature refers to pre-
2For example, Monitor (2015), the then sector regulator for health services in England, found
that “many [patients] were also thought to be happy to be guided by their GP” as regards their
choice of health care provider. As of April 2016, Monitor is part of NHS Improvement, a government
authority responsible for overseeing foundation trusts and NHS trusts, as well as independent
providers that provide NHS-funded care.
3Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) are publicly funded local bodies that purchase hospital services for
the local population on behalf of their associated GPs. Going forward, the Health and Social Care
Act (2012) abolished PCTs and, from 2013/14, transferred budgetary management responsibilities
to GP practices, now referred to as Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs). This system post-
dates the data used in this study.
4See, for example, GPs referrals fall amid claims of rationed care in stretched NHS, available
at https://www.theguardian.com/society/2011/sep/09/gp-referrals-fall-stretched-nhs
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selected choice sets as consideration sets (Howard and Sheth (1969)). Mehta, Rajiv
and Srinivasan (2003) estimate a dynamic structural model of consideration set
formation and brand choice model in the context of price discovery for experience
goods that are frequently purchased. Unlike in the context of the present paper
where the pre-selected choice-set for a credence good is governed by a third-party
agent, the consideration set formation process in Metha et al. is part of the sole
decision maker’s fixed-sample search strategy. Sovinsky Goeree (2008) proposes a
model of consideration set formation that treats the inclusion decisions with respect
to each choice alternative as endogenously driven by product advertisement, absent
a constraint on the choice set size.
In the healthcare literature, the standard approach has been to treat the GP and
the patient as a single decision maker (e.g Beckert et al. (2012)). Gaynor, Propper
and Seiler (2016) are the first to model the GP led consideration set formation. In
their model, consideration sets are generated subject to a constraint on the choice
set size, by requiring that included choice alternatives be within a fixed distance of
the alternative associated with maximal utility; the resulting choice sets are allowed
to vary by GP and PCT. We offer a complementary approach. In our model the
cost across experts (GPs) of acquiring and disseminating information is modelled as
a determinant of choice set size and composition, and it is quantified explicitly. This
approach has a particularly intuitive appeal in light of information asymmetries.
From an econometric perspective, the endogeneity of the set of choice alter-
natives constitutes a potential sample selection problem. It essentially arises from
correlation between unobservables in the agent-level selection model and those in the
principal-level final outcomes (choice) model. Such correlation may bias estimation
results. This is similar to the well-known issue of incidental truncation (Heckman
(1976)) whereby decision outcomes of interest are only observed for a selected sub-
sample and where failure to properly model the sample selection mechanism induces
the estimates of the outcome relationship to be biased and inconsistent. This has
also been noted by Eizenberg (2014) and Jacobi and Sovinsky (2016). Similar is-
sues also arise in the analysis of endogenous sample attrition (Hausman and Wise
(1979)).
Methodological econometric issues aside, why is the distinction between prin-
cipal and agent, when agents are imperfect, relevant for applied work? It is well
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established that misalignment of incentives between principal and agent can give
rise to market failures, resulting in suboptimal outcomes. In the present context,
patients may be nudged into choosing a hospital that they would not have chosen
had they been given different options. The distinction also matters for competi-
tion analysis. Demand estimation and merger simulation often feature in antitrust
authorities’ investigations of mergers. Beckert et al. (2012) discuss conventional
hospital choice analysis, under the assumption of exogenous choice sets, and its use
in hospital merger analysis. This sort of analysis does not distinguish between pa-
tients and GPs and their respective incentives. If hospitals compete for patients
indirectly, via competing for GPs, then ignoring this distinction may lead to an
incomplete competition assessment.
This paper proposes a micro-founded two-stage choice framework that links the
pre-selection of a choice set of hospitals by the GP, as an “expert” agent on the
first stage, with the choice of an alternative out of this set at the second stage by
the patient, the principal and ultimate beneficiary of the choice outcome. It thereby
provides a definition of “expert” agent, as opposed to “layman” principal. The model
is applied to Health Episode Statistics (HES) data for hip replacement patients. This
type of data is widely used in the empirical health care economics literature (Beckert
et al. (2012), Beckert and Kelly (2017), Gaynor et al. (2016), Santos et al. (2013),
Sivey (2012)), notably for the purpose of demand analysis. Importantly, HES data
is also a primary source used by the UK competition authority, the Competition
and Markets Authority (CMA).
The empirical analysis in this paper presents results that demonstrate the po-
tential inconsistency of estimators when the endogeneity of choice sets is ignored.
Estimates for the GP-level model proposed in this paper reveal that pre-selection
by the GP is primarily driven by distance to the hospital, hospital quality and cost
of treatment to the Clinical Commissioning Group that the GP is accountable to.
The latter finding is consistent with GPs’ conflict of interest at the intersection of
their roles of agents of both, patients and health authorities. Once these drivers of
GP-level pre-selection are accounted for by the pre-selected choice set, the results
show that patients do not care about residual quality differences and that they focus
instead on other tangible hospital attributes. In particular, it shows that waiting
times - once their endogeneity is taken account of -, residual distance and hospital
amenities are critical attributes to patients. In existing choice models, the effects of
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these attributes sometimes appear with unexpected signs (e.g. Gaynor et al. (2016)
who report positive waiting time effects for coronary artery bypass grafts5) or sta-
tistically insignificant.6 At the same time, the residual distance effect that emerges
is much more muted from the patient’s perspective than has been found in other
models (e.g. Beckert et al. (2012), Gaynor et al. (2016)).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the insti-
tutional background with regard to patient choice in the English NHS. Section 3
describes the data that forms the empirical basis of the study. Section 4 provides
an overview of our econometric model for the patient / GP decision process and
discusses identification, with details on specification and estimation relegated to a
technical appendix. Section 5 presents results from the estimation of these models.
And Section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional Background
The majority of primary and secondary health care in England is provided through
the taxpayer funded National Health Service (NHS).7 For patients, it is free at the
point of use. Primary care is provided by General Practitioners (GPs). In the period
studied in this paper, 2011/12, publicly funded local bodies, Primary Care Trusts
(PCTs), make up the NHS commissioning system, i.e. they manage health care
budgets and purchase secondary care, e.g. for elective medical procedures and other
hospital services, for the local population. GPs thereby make referral decisions and
so get to decide how some of the health care budgets is spent.8 Patients can only
5They do point out that this finding can be rationalized in light of the severity of the underlying
medical condition and the risk of the procedure; additional waiting time may leave the patient time
to arrange necessary personal affairs.
6Goldman and Romley (2008), using stated preference data, do demonstrate significant amenity
effects. Sivey (2012), using HES data for cataract surgery patients, finds negative waiting time
effects. The systematic review by Aggarwal et al (2016) reports negative effects of waiting time on
patients’ choice outcomes.
7A private health care market exists in the UK, but it is excluded from the analysis of this
paper.
8Patient choice of GP is relatively limited and typically restricted to GPs whose practices are
local to the patient’s area of residence; i.e. patients living in a given PCT are registered with a
GP in the same PCT.
6
obtain access to secondary care through a referral from their GP. GPs therefore act
as gatekeepers to secondary care, both with regard to in-patient and out-patient
appointments.
Several waves of legislative reforms of the NHS over the past decade have in-
creased the choice patients have over where they receive elective care. The first
set of reforms gave patients a formal choice over where to attend a first outpatient
appointment when referred by their GP (or consultant). From January 2006, GPs
were required to offer patients a choice of (four to) five hospitals. They were also
required to raise awareness of patients’ right to choose. This replaced a system
where patients could state preferences but GPs were under no obligation to offer
patients a choice. In 2008, essentially all restrictions on the number of providers
patients were able to choose from were removed. This established “free choice” of
provider. These reforms were part of a set of market-related policies intended to im-
prove hospital efficiency, make hospitals more responsive to patients needs, improve
quality and improve equity by opening choice to all (Dixon et al. (2010)). A series
of work has estimated the impact of patient choice on hospital quality by comparing
areas with different degrees of potential competition, and finds that higher degrees
of competition are associated with greater improvements in quality (Cooper et al.
(2011), Gaynor et al. (2013)).
From a practical point of view, the choice architecture was implemented through
an electronic booking system, “Choose and Book”, which allows GPs to shortlist
appropriate hospital services for their patients and, subsequently, enables patients
to book their appointment, either at the GP practice, by phone or online. In this
institutional setting, the GP is critical to the patient’s exercise of choice.
NHS funded hospital care has historically been delivered by state owned and
state run NHS Acute Trusts, or hospitals.9 Under the Payments by Results NHS
funding architecture,10 commissioners (PCTs) pay health care providers, such as
hospitals, a national tariff, i.e. a per patient payment based on the treatment they
provide.11 There is some variation in tariffs across hospitals captured by a Market
9A NHS Acute Trust may be comprised of a single hospital or multiple hospital sites within the
same geographic area.
10https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/simple-guide-to-payment-by-results
11Hospital care is grouped into Healthcare Resource Groups (HRGs), which are similar to Diag-
nostic Resource Groups in the US. Prices or Tariffs are then set at a national level based on the
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Forces Factor (MFF) which is an adjustment to the national tariff. This adjustment
is unique to each provider and reflects that it is more expensive to provide health
care services in certain areas, e.g. due to local estate costs or wage levels.
In 2011/12, such treatments were funded from fixed PCT budgets. These budgets
for the cost of care for the local population were fixed annually, hospitals were paid
a fixed price per referral, and hence the costs of GP referrals fall on the fixed
budget of the PCT to which the GP belongs. This raises the question whether
GPs internalize these costs and take account of the externalities of a given referral
on the opportunities of other patients to receive treatment. Indeed, GPs may find
themselves as a rationing agents on behalf of the PCT which pays for care.12 GPs
may therefore face conflicts of interest, balancing interests of a given patient with
those of other patients and with the objectives of PCTs.13
A Report published in July 2011 by the Cooperation and Competition Panel
into the operation of any willing provider for the provision of routine elective care
(Cooperation and Competition Panel, 2011) shows the ways in which some PCTs
sought to influence GPs’ referrals for elective care. PCTs cited concerns regarding
value for money as the primary reason for influencing GPs. The report notes that the
MFF is one way in which these value-for-money considerations arise: “In relation
to the market forces factor, one provider showed us correspondence relating to a
patient referral decision where a GP had persuaded a patient not to go to their
preferred provider of routine elective care because of the higher cost to the PCT
of that provider arising from the market forces factor. We also saw correspondence
between an SHA [Strategic Health Authority] and a provider concerning the higher
cost of sending patients to that provider as a result of the market forces factor, and
the actions that PCTs in the SHA were, as a result, taking to ensure that patients
were treated by other providers. A PCT chief executive told us that “in London
where you have providers in close proximity with different uplifts, it is clearly in
the PCT’s interest to encourage activity to go to those with a lower market forces
average cost of providing the associated care.
12For example, Blundell et al. (2010) report GPs’ “preoccupation with overreferral” and interpret
it as “a worrying consequence of perceptions of pressure on limited healthcare resources.”
13GPs located in a given PCT can have significant portions of patients who live in adjacent
PCTs. But it is the PCT that the practice belongs to that bears the the costs of all patients
registered at the practive, irrespective of whether the patients live within the PCT’s geographic
boundaries.
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factors and reinvest the savings in other health improving outcomes”. The Report
goes on to say not all PCTs necessarily respond to this incentive, however.14
Studies of earlier periods during which some GP practices participated in a fund-
holding scheme (1991 - 1999) aimed at increasing GPs’ budgetary responsibilities
(Dusheiko et al. (2006), and Dusheiko et al. (2007)) show that the patient-physician
agency relationship is weak, i.e. GPs do not act solely in the interest of patients.
To the extent that such incentives induced by PCTs exist, this is not unlike in the
pre-reform period when PCTs contracted secondary care provision out to local NHS
Trusts (bulk contracts). GPs were expected to refer their patients to contracted
hospitals only and had to justify any referrals to non-contracted hospitals in light
of the extra costs to the PCT caused by such off-contract referrals.
During the period of our study, some PCTs introduced formal referral manage-
ment systems. Such referral management systems involve a spectrum of approaches
and objectives. One of the dominant first stage objectives is to determine whether a
referral is necessary, following clinical triage. This objective aims at demand man-
agement at the extensive margin, in order to reduce unnecessary referrals in the
first place. This objective interacts with a subsequent, second stage objective of
determining a suitable referral destination, in consultation with the patient and GP.
The analysis in this paper relates to the second stage in the referral management
process, choice of hospital at the point of referral. While we do not model their
role explicitly, we note that there are at least two ways how referral management
systems might affect the model.
First, conditional on passing the first stage necessity test, referral management
systems might impose further constraints and incentives on the GP level hospital
evaluation and selection process - e.g. inducing diversions to out-of-hospital services,
at the expense of longer distances - and thereby enhance the GP’s role in the joint
patient-GP decision process and, to some extent, curtail the patient’s freedom to
choose. As such, they may change the composition of the set of choice alternatives
14It quotes a PCT as saying that “when going to AWP [Any Willing Provider] for services we
include a maximum tariff to ensure providing value for money. Whatever pricing agreements are
in place, the choice of provider is still left to patients and the PCT does not direct patients to
certain providers”.
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that a patient is being presented with.
Second, to the extent that such systems might de-motivate GPs and erect barriers
between GPs and consultants, they may actually increase the cost of inclusion of
choice alternatives in the pre-selected set and thereby constrain patients’ choice
options, i.e. they may reduce the number of choice alternatives and thus the size of
the set of choice alternatives being presented to patients.
Such restrictions on the size and the composition of choice sets presented to
patients are also supported by Rosen et al. (2007) who find that “the referral
management centre opened by one primary care trust [at the time of their study]
was seen to restrict choice”.
Hence, referral management systems are likely to reinforce the relationship iden-
tified in our study.
3 Data
This study uses administrative data, Health Episode Statistics (HES), collected
by the UK Department of Health for every NHS funded inpatient admission in
England. HES data are widely used in academic research (Beckert et al. (2012),
Beckert and Kelly (2017), Gaynor et al (2016), Santos et al. (2013), Sivey (2012))
and also constitute the primary empirical basis for any quantitative work in the area
of health care demand carried out by UK competition authorities.
The study considers approximately 30,000 NHS funded hip replacement patients
in 2011/12.15 These patients were advised at 4721 GP practices; for ease of exposi-
tion, GP and GP practice are treated synonymously in the remainder of the paper.16
Appendix B provides details on how the GP sample was selected. Patients in the
15The analysis uses selected orthopaedic treatments, so called Healthcare Resources Groups
(HRGs) at spell level derived from the Secondary Uses Service (SUS) Payments by Results (PbR)
data - HB11, HB12, HB13 and HB14 - and, within these, treatment specifications relating to
general surgery and trauma and orthopaedics - Treatment Function Codes 100 and 110. HES data
only record treatments, i.e. patients who actually had a hip replacement; patients contemplating
a hip replacement, but ultimately choosing not to undergo surgery or to do so at a private clinic,
are not recorded. Therefore, in this application there is no outside option.
16This is the approach also taken in Gaynor et al. (2016).
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sample were treated at one of 168 NHS hospital sites that carried out at least 10
hip replacements in 2011/12 and for which a set of hospital attributes is available.17
The analysis only considers GP practices that refer to between one and seven NHS
hospitals.
For each patient episode in the sample, the data record the patient’s age, local
area of residence and the site of the hospital where the patient was treated. They
record the dates of referral and treatment from which we compute the patient’s
waiting time, i.e. the time that elapsed between referral and treatment. From
these waiting times, hospital level median waiting times can be constructed as a
hospital attribute. Various hospital attributes can be merged in, from publicly ac-
cessible databases maintained by the Health and Social Care Information Centre
(HSCIC). They include quality measures, such as Hospital Standardised Mortality
Ratios (HSMR) which relate the actual number of deaths at the hospital to the
expected number of deaths, given the characteristics of the patients treated at the
hospital (case mix). They also include the Market Forces Factor (MFF) and hos-
pital amenities, such as parking spaces at the hospital. Table 1 provides summary
statistics on the hospital attributes included in this study.
HES records also record the GP practice that made the referral for treatment at a
hospital site. Using the GP practice identifier, practice attributes can be included,
some of them also from HSCIC sources. Practice attributes will be relevant to
the extent that they act as drivers of practice level costs of pre-selecting choice
alternatives.18 They include the number of GPs at the practice: Larger practices
17We exclude NHS funded treatments at private providers in this study. For the choice model
considered in this paper, we cannot include private providers - Independent Sector Treatment
Centres (ISTCs) or Independent Sector Providers (ISPs) because there are no clinical quality
measures comparable to HSMRs for our period. We would have to use a different measure, e.g.
estimated readmissions rates or survey data, such as PROMs. We decided to use a quality measure
that is officially published and, as such, is the same piece of (relatively) “hard intelligence” for all
GPs. See the Identification section 4.2 below, for further discussion.
We acknowledge that excluding the private sector, where waiting times are considerably lower,
may lead us to underestimate the waiting time effect. We note in this context that Dixon and
Robertson (2009) find that the “independent sector was not perceived as much of a threat” and
rather “acted as a partner for the NHS, providing extra capacity to help the NHS meeting waiting
time targets”. Beckert and Kelly (2017) study hip replacement patients’ sorting between private
and public providers.
18The following section provides a detailed exposition of the two-stage choice model that discusses
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enjoy a richer pool of experience and information and hence are likely to more easily
facilitate choice. The analysis also considers measures of the heterogeneity of the
practice’s patient pool. From HES records, we construct the coefficient of variation
with respect to age at the practice level as a measure of dispersion. In our GP
pre-selection model, we allow the cost of offering a set of alternatives to depend on
the heterogeneity of patients, so that the net value of a given choice set is allowed
to be higher the more diverse the pool of patients is to whom this set if offered.19
The first columns in Table 2 summarizes the distribution of the GP level co-
efficient of variation with respect to age. The age variation at the practice level
is skewed to the left, i.e. towards practices with more homogeneous patient pools
with respect to age. The median coefficient of variation with respect to age at the
practice level is 19.2 percent, while the lower (upper) quartile is 13.3 (28.4) percent.
Practices referring to a single hospital tend to have more homogenous patients, with
a median coefficient of variation with respect to age of 16.6 percent, compared to
20.5 percent for practices referring to several hospitals. The former practices also
tend to be smaller, with an average of 4.2 GPs pre practice, versus 5.4 for the latter.
The locational information regarding patients, GPs and hospitals sites permits
calculating straight-line distances between hospitals and GPs, and residual distances
between hospitals and patients, respectively.20 We refer to the latter as residual
distances to account for the fact that distance may already be taken into account
by GPs pre-selecting hospitals choice sets for patients to choose from.
These GP-level referral data allow to construct hospitals’ catchment areas with
respect to hip replacements, i.e. the set of GP practices that refer hip replacement
patients to them. The panel structure of the data, which associates multiple patients
at the practice with potentially different treatment destinations, allows us to infer,
or at least approximate, the set of hospital alternatives pre-selected by the GP as
the set of hospitals that patients at a given practice were referred to and treated
at. This is the same evidence base as in Gaynor et al. (2016). The approach
the role of costs at the first stage of GP-level pre-selection.
19For example, Harding et al. (2014) report that older patients, while valuing the freedom to
choose, tend to shun exercising choice and to revert to their local hospital. This would suggest
that the cost of promoting choice is higher at practices with predominantly older patients.
20The GP level distances are calculated using GP practice postcodes. The patient level distances
are calculated using the patients LSOA.
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taken in this paper implicitly assumes that hospitals that were chosen by at least
one patient are part of the choice set and discussion between GP and patients.21
It also assumes that the sample is informative enough to separate with reasonable
reliability hospitals that were never chosen from those that were chosen by some
patients. This leaves a risk of potential measurement error in the construction of
the pre-selected choice sets at the GP practice level, which will be considered when
assessing potential resulting biases in estimation.22
The approximation adopted in this paper, in our view, is the best possible ap-
proach given the available empirical basis for health care demand analysis. HES
data are currently the most comprehensive data records for this kind of undertak-
ing. Details of conversations between GPs and patients are confidential and not
recorded. And additional data gathering exercises to date have proven unfruitful.
For example, an alternative approach to identify the set of hospitals pre-selected by
GPs would be to conduct a survey and use the results to explore the factors that
these agents take into account when guiding patients choices. However, previous
attempts to survey GPs have been frustrated by very low response rates. For exam-
ple, in the Competition Commission’s (CC) Royal Bournemouth and Christchurch
Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust and Poole Hospital NHS Foundation Trust merger
inquiry (2013), the important role of GPs in the referral process was recognized, but
no strong conclusions could be drawn (para 6.98, Final Report), because out of 1099
GPs in the hospitals’ catchment areas only 36 GPs (associated with 23 GP practices)
21In the context of our paper, if two patients have the same GP, then the distribution of their
consideration sets satisfies the uniform conditioning property in McFadden (1977); if two patients
have different GPs, then the distribution of their consideration sets satisfies McFadden’s positive
conditioning property.
22It may be worth mentioning that selection of information on outcomes is not uncommon as
consideration sets are rarely observed. Gaynor et al. (2016) use the same data to model the choice
options GPs offer to patients for their choice of hospitals when undergoing coronary artery bypass
graft surgery. And Eizenberg (2012), in a study of the home PC market, also proceeds in a similar
fashion: he infers the feasible set of Intel chips as those that PC manufacturers chose to offer in their
products and that sold at least 10,000 units. Furthermore, our approach is essentially the same
as the Inter-Personal Logit (IPL) in Crawford et al. (2016). Our setting meets their Condition 1
on sufficient sets which, together with the logit assumption, yields consistent estimators (Prop.1
in Crawford et al. (2016)); see section 3.4.5 of Crawford et al. (2016). We thank R. Griffith for
pointing this out. In fact, their notion of sufficient sets is reminiscent of the sets of quasi regular
states in the stochastic process theory literature.
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provided complete survey responses (GfK presentation to CC, 2013). Furthermore,
stated preference surveys risk to yield biased responses in this context. The use of
revealed preference data allows the analyst to overcome these challenges.
Table 3 shows the distribution of the number of hospitals referred to, at the GP
practice level. Even though patients choice had already been mandated for several
years by 2011/12, a large fraction of GP practices (43.15 per cent in the sample used
in the analysis) only referred to a single hospital (that meets the attribute data
requirements); this is consistent with GP survey evidence (e.g. Monitor (2015))
that many GPs identify a “default provider”. And over ninety percent refer to no
more than three; also this is consistent with GP survey evidence (Monitor (2015),
Dixon et al. (2010)) that most GPs discuss two or three, and at most five, hospital
alternatives with their patients.23
The average age of hip replacement patients in our sample is 68.6, and the median
is 68, with lower quartile 58 and upper quartile 76 and a standard deviation of 17.71.
So the patient age distribution is almost symmetric about its mean. Similarly,
at the practice level, the distribution of average patient age is fairly symmetric,
with median average age at the practice level of 66.33, lower quartile 60.5 and
upper quartile 70.97 (standard deviation 11.34). Table 2, second column, provides
summary statistics on the GP level average patient age distribution.
The remaining columns of Table 2 shows some further GP practice level statistics.
The mean number of GPs at the practice level is just below 4, skewed to the left,
i.e. to practices with a small number of GPs (see also Kelly and Stoye (2014)).
With regard to distances, Table 2 shows that pre-selected hospitals are closer than
the average hospital in the GP’s consideration set. The distribution of distance to
hospitals in GPs’ consideration sets is broadly similar to the distribution of distances
23Evidence provided by the King’s Fund (Dixon et al. (2010)) shows that about 49 percent
of patients say they were given two hospitals to choose from, 49 percent said they could choose
between three and five, and only two percent reported having more than five hospitals to choose
from. Monitor (2015), presenting GP survey evidence on referral practice, find: “This GP uses
Choose and Book and gets a list of providers local to the patient. She then selects those NHS
providers that are closest and discusses which the patient would prefer”; hospitals local to the
patient are also local to the GP practice as patient overwhelmingly choose nearby GP practices;
and GP survey respondents say they typically discuss no more than two or three, and at most five,
hospitals options.
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between patients and hospitals in their GPs’ consideration sets.
4 Econometric Model
4.1 Model Overview
This section provides a high-level overview of the two-stage model for the GP and
patient level choice process that we estimate in this paper. The model encompasses
the GP’s pre-selection of a choice set of hospital alternatives at the first stage, from
which the patient makes a final choice at the second stage. Readers with interest
in the details of the econometric model specification and estimation are referred to
Appendix C.
The modelling approach is motivated by qualitative evidence on the merely par-
tial overlap of the information sets that patients and GPs base their valuations and
decisions on. We review this evidence in the following subsection 4.2 on identifica-
tion, in order to justify our modelling assumptions.
GPs – as experts not only on medical diagnosis, but also on health care providers
– can assess the quality of hospital alternatives. Patients – as laymen – either do
not have access to this information, or they typically find it difficult to interpret.
This makes GP level pre-selection of choice alternatives efficient. However, GPs as
agents of health authorities may face incentives that are irrelevant to patients, e.g.
with regard to financial implications of referral decisions captured by the MFF. We
label such attributes of hospital j that are considered by the GP, i.e. that are in the
GP’s information set and that the GP acts upon, by xaj , j ∈ J , where J is the set
of all hospitals considered by patient i’s GP.
Patients, in turn, may pay attention to hospital amenities that do not matter
to the GP, i.e. while they are in the GP’s information set the GP does not act
upon them when making a choice set pre-selection decision. We label such hospital
attributes xpj . GPs typically have incomplete information on patient preferences
and all the hospital attributes that are salient to patients. Our model accounts for
such information asymmetries. This information asymmetry is one justification for
a mandate for GPs to offer choice to patients.
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Hospital attributes considered by both, GPs and patients – i.e. attributes that
are in the information sets of both and acted upon by both – include waiting times
and distance. These are labelled xcij.
Table 4 summarizes the information asymmetries of the micro-theoretic GP and
patient level choice models.24
Pre-selecting a choice set J ai ⊂ J for patient i to choose from is costly for patient
i’s GP. We model this as a unit cost C > 0 for the GP to include a hospital into
the set of choice alternatives. This cost may be specific to the GP. For example, in
the context of hospital choice in the UK where a GP (practice) plays the role of the
patient’s agent, this cost might be expected to be a convex function c(z) of practice
level patient heterogeneity and the number of GPs in the practice. It imposes a
constraint that can be thought of as the effort the GP needs to exert in order to
explain the features, pros and cons of the alternative to the patient.
We model the GP’s pre-selection decision as a concave constrained maximization
problem in which the GP maximizes the value IG(xci ,x
a) of candidate sets G ⊂ J
of hospitals, on the basis of xaj and x
c
ij, j ∈ G, subject to incremental costs c(z), i.e.
J ai = arg maxG∈P {IG(x
c
i ,x
a)− c(z)#G} ,
where P is the set of all subsets of J and IG(xci ,xa) is increasing in #G.
The GP thus reduces the complexity of the choice problem for the patient, by
narrowing the set of conceivable choice alternatives J down to J ai . At the same
time, the information asymmetry and ensuing misalignment of assessment criteria
between patient and GP results in a choice set J ai which may be suboptimal when
evaluated on the basis of the attributes xci and x
p relevant to patient i.
The pre-selected choice sets J ai vary across patients i, to the extent that the at-
tributes considered by both, GP and patient, xcij, vary with i; e.g. distance between
i and hospital j. In practice, the GP may pre-select a uniform choice set J a at the
outset on the basis of xa and xc as they relate to an “average” or “hybrid” patient
and then offer this set to all patients at the practice. In light of the limitations on
our data, we adopt this modelling assumption.
We model the second stage patient choice, given J a and hospital attributes xci
24Table 5 summarises the econometric version of the model, as it is detailed in Appendix C.
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and xp salient to patient i’s choice, as a multinomial logit model. In our econometric
analysis, we allow for correlation between unobservables (to the econometrician) in
the GP level pre-selection model and unobservables in the patient level choice model,
in order to guard against possible non-random sample selection effects.
4.2 Identification
In this section, we discuss the identification of our econometric model.25 The pa-
tient’s indirect conditional utility δij, conditional on the pre-selected J a, is identified
through patients’ choices from this set and variation in attributes across choice al-
ternatives. Regarding the GP’s pre-selection model, the GP’s assessment of patient
i’s benefit of hospital j, αij, is identified through variation in attributes across al-
ternatives and their inclusion in, respectively exclusion from, J a.26
Furthermore, the value IJ a(xc,xa) of J a is increasing in the imprecision of the
GP’s incomplete information about patients’ valuation criteria, albeit less than lin-
early.27 This imprecision is captured by a scale parameter σ on the extreme value
errors of the patient level logit model. This scale parameter is identified through
variation in set sizes across agents with the same levels of cost drivers. This feature
of the constrained pre-selection model is an interesting departure from the usual lack
of identification of scale on the selection stage in non-random selection (incidental
truncation) models absent constraints.
Unless the coefficients θc on the attributes x
c
ij considered by both, GP and pa-
tient, are restricted to be identical across the patient and GP models, the log-
likelihood of the two-stage model splits into a part that captures the GP’s pre-
selection and a part that captures the patient’s choice, conditional on the pre-selected
choice set. In this case, there are no parametric restrictions across the two parts, so
25The notation in this section therefore refers to the econometric model specification that is
detailed in Appendix C.
26For example, if αij = v for all j ∈ J , then the inequalities C-3 in Appendix C imply
ln
(
Ja + 1
Ja
)
≤ c(z) ≤ ln
(
Ja
Ja − 1
)
.
Hence, the cardinality Ja = #J a, i.e. the size of the pre-selected choice set, next to variation in
cost drivers z, identifies the agent’s cost function c(z).
27The GP’s incomplete information is captured by ξij in Table 4.
17
they can be estimated separately and consistently under the aforementioned iden-
tifying assumption. This is the approach taken below. The model by Gaynor et
al (2016) shares this feature. The first-stage GP level pre-selection amounts to a
nonlinear version of the classical incidental truncation model. The analogy to the
classical linear incidental truncation model makes clear that for identification of the
two-stage model, it is necessary that the true coefficients on xa and xc, θa and θc,
satisfy θa 6= 0 and θp 6= 0, i.e. exclusion restrictions must be in place that ensure
independent exogenous variation at both, the GP and the patient stage. Therefore,
absent any restriction on θc across the two stages of the model, the GP level pre-
selection model can be estimated separately and inverted to retrieve imputations of
unobservables (to the econometrician) in the GP pre-selection model µij; these can
be used to impute unobservables (to the econometrician) in the patient choice model
ζij which, in turn, can be used as embedded regressors in a second-step estimation
of the patient’s choice model. Appendix C.3 provides technical details.
The following approach is taken with regard to the exclusion restrictions. It is
motivated by qualitative evidence in Rosen et al. (2007) who observe that “patients
and GPs seek partially overlapping, but different characteristics when choosing a
hospital.” Their study finds that for GPs clinical aspects of care and waiting times
are the most important hospital attributes, and that constraints on geography, i.e.
distance, are an important equity issue GPs consider when offering choice.
Dixon and Robertson (2009) find that patients do not take hospital quality into
consideration when choosing a hospital: “Patients made little use of available infor-
mation on the performance of hospitals; just 4 percent consulted the NHS Choices
website [· · · ] Instead, they relied heavily on [· · · ] the advice of their GP.” In other
words, patients obviously care about clinical outcomes and quality, but they defer
to their GPs’ assessment when making decisions.
They also report that “GPs we spoke to did not think patients were interested in
information about comparative performance”. And they report a similar view held
by providers: “Providers were quite sceptical about the extent to which patients
were acting as informed consumers. Any observed changes in referral patterns were
largely seen to be a result of GP decisions”.
With regard to patients, the importance of distance and waiting times is sup-
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ported by these and other studies (Beckert et al. (2012), Gaynor et al. (2017)). With
regard to distance, our analysis distinguishes distances between GPs and hospitals,
and residual distances between patients and those hospitals that are pre-selected by
the GP and presented to patients as choice alternatives.
The importance of amenities to patients is supported by Dixon and Robertson’s
finding that providers emphasise delivering a positive overall patient experience.
They quote a Foundation Trust representative as saying “[patients] would make
that choice on the basis of a whole range of indicators in terms of patient experience
and what matters most, and that’s from car parking to clinical outcomes.”
The role of more broadly defined amenities in patients’ hospital choice (including
pleasant surroundings, attentive staff) has also been documented by Goldman and
Romley (2008) on the basis of stated preference (survey) data. Patients’ focus on
amenities is also echoed by Coulter et al. (2005). Hence, hospital amenities (in the
form of parking space) are attributes xp that are assumed to solely matter to the
patient, but not to the GP.
The analysis considers two hospital attributes that are assumed to be considered
solely by the GP, xa. The first is the hospital’s clinical quality. It is well recognized
that hospital quality is difficult to assess, even for quantitative researchers, because
many quality measures suffer from selection bias (Gowrisankaran and Town (1999))
and this is unlikely to be taken into account by the patient.
The GP level model considers the Hospital Standardised Mortality Ratio (HSMR)
as measure of clinical quality. It puts the actual number of deaths at the hospital in
relation to the expected number of deaths, given the characteristics of the patients
treated at the hospital (case mix); the case mix adjustment is designed to guard
against selection bias.
Alternative quality measures have been considered in the literature. Gutacker
et al. (2016) and Skellern (2016) consider Patient Reported Outcome Measures
(PROMs) as quality measure. PROMs data directly capture health gains as ex-
perienced by patients. The potential draw-back is that they are self-reported and
thereby also risk being contaminated by selection bias. Valderas et al. (2011) point
out that the link between healthcare outcomes and self-reported health status is
unclear. Hutchings et al. (2012) report that reponse rates vary with patient charac-
19
teristics and that non-respondents have worse outcomes. Beckert and Kelly (2017)
use their own estimates of hospital level readmission rates for orthopaedic surgeries,
adjusted for case mix. This measure is not available to GPs and hence not in their
information set, while HSMRs are formal published measures of quality and as such
in GPs information set. Since our model revolves specifically around information
asymmetries, the public availability and absence of selection bias justifies the choice
of HSMR as clinical quality measure.
While hospital quality is clearly relevant to the patient, patients typically rely
on expert advice to judge the quality of health care provision, so it seems reasonable
to include HSMR in xa. This is in line with survey evidence collected by the King’s
Fund (Dixon and Robertson (2009)) that patients don’t use quality measures when
choosing a hospital. Nonetheless, the model allows patients’ perceptions of hospital
quality to affect their choice. Appendix C provides details on how the model allows
patient level valuations to be correlated with GP level valuations. Such correla-
tion would be expected to arise if the GP’s quality assessments, unobserved by the
econometrician, were factored into the patient’s valuations. The model thus allows
patients to respond to hospital quality as they perceive it through their GP. We
return to this when discussing our results.
The second attribute in xa is the hospital’s Market Forces Factor (MFF), which
is an adjustment to the national tariff NHS hospitals are compensated at for specific
treatments such a hip replacements; this adjustment is unique to each provider and
reflects that it is more expensive to provide health care services in certain areas, e.g.
due to local estate costs or wage levels. Propper and Van Reenen (2010) argue that,
because local wages do not adjust to the MFF, this causes lower hospital quality.
Another hypothesis might be that referrals for treatment at hospitals with high
MFF are more expensive and, in light of budgetary constraints, discouraged by the
Primary Care Trust that the GP belongs to. Figure 1 shows that the MFF within
and across GP practices exhibits considerable variation and hence is not merely a
measure of the GP practice’s geographic location. Hospitals attributes xc that are
assumed to be considered by both, patient and GP, include the respective distance
to a hospital and the (median) waiting time until treatment at the hospital.
As alluded to earlier, the cost function c(z) needs to be weakly convex in or-
der to guarantee an interior solution, i.e. a pre-selected set J a that is a (strict)
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subset of J . Costs in our model are in the same units as indirect utility. Hence,
the average level of costs, which is not attributed to cost drivers, and the average
level of indirect utility, which is not due to alternative specific attributes, cannot be
identified separately. Metha et al. (2003) encounter an analogous lack of identifica-
tion. Furthermore, this cost function must be specified at the GP (practice) level,
i.e. it cannot vary with hospital alternative j; if it did, then for an included hos-
pital alternative it would be indistinguishable from the utility contribution of that
hospital to the inclusive value associated with J a. For GPs at the practice, includ-
ing a hospital in the choice set J a may be costly because its salient characteristics
need to be researched and because its suitability for a patient with given charac-
teristics needs to be assessed. For example, a report by the National Audit Office
(NAO (2005)) documents that 90 percent of GPs believe their overall workload will
increase as a result of the implementation of Choose and Book, and that only 3
percent feel very positive and 15 percent a little positive about the introduction of
choice. The analysis considers two GP practice attributes z that may determine
the cost c(z) of inclusion of choice alternatives in the pre-selected choice set J a.
First, the number of GPs at the practice, as a measure of collective experience with
regard to referral success, may be hypothesised to lower the cost of inclusion. Sec-
ond, relatively homogeneous patients are likely to benefit less from the inclusion of
additional choice alternatives than patients with heterogeneous characteristics and
needs. This makes the opportunity cost of not including more choice alternatives
relatively low for practices with homogeneous patients, compared to practices with
more heterogeneous patients. To control for this, the analysis considers as a second
cost driver the coefficient of variation with respect to age of patients at the practice
level.
Finally, the GP’s consideration set needs to be defined in a practical manner.
This problem is not new: Gaynor et al. (2016), using HES data as well for coronary
artery bypass graft (CABG) patients, face essentially the same problem, except that
there are only 29 hospitals performing CABGs, while the number of NHS hospitals
preforming at least ten hip replacements in 2011/12 is 168 and as such renders the
dimensionality of the GP level pre-selection problem impractically large. In fact, the
set J that a GP (practice) considers is very likely much smaller. In our approach,
all GPs have at least 7 hospitals to choose from; Figure 2 shows the distribution of
consideration set sizes across GPs.
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Our approach uses the following algorithm in order to construct the sets J
considered by GPs from which the choice sets J a are pre-selected. For each NHS
hospital site, the hospital’s catchment area in terms of GP practices is defined as
the smallest set of GP practices that collectively refer at least 80 per cent of the
hospital’s hip replacement patients. The geographic size of the hospital’s catchment
area is then determined as the maximum distance between the hospital and any of
the GP practices in this set; the median of the maximal distances is 66km. And
the geographic catchment area of the hospital is given by the circular area about
it, radially defined by that maximal distance. The hospital is included in a GP
practice’s consideration set J if the practice is in its geographic catchment area.
For some GP practices, located in large metropolitan areas, the cardinality of J
determined in this manner is rather large. To reduce the dimensionality of the pre-
selection problem for such practices, J is defined as the intersection of these sets
and the set of the k nearest hospitals. The sensitivity of this definition of GP level
consideration sets with respect to k reveals that, for 86 per cent of GP practices,
no more than one patient chooses to be treated at a hospital that is not among
the k = 15 nearest hospitals, and for only one GP practice there are 5 patients who
choose more distant hospitals. Such referrals are ignored by the present analysis and
k = 15 is chosen as cut-off. Given that most patients report to have been given no
more than 5 choice alternatives (Dixon et al. (2010)), this approach appears to err on
the side that is generous towards GPs. Our approach may simply eliminate atypical
choice situations, i.e. the choice outcome may well be due to reasons unidentifiable
in the data, e.g. the patient has family living near such relatively distant hospitals.28
Also, to place this approach into the context of research practice, defining the
consideration set via a limit on joint market share to manage the computational
burden is not uncommon. For example, Eizenberg (2012) in his study of the home
PC market restricts the number of product lines to those whose joint market share
is 70 percent. Our approach conforms with the notion of sufficient sets and the
Inter-Personal Logit (IPL) model in Crawford et al. (2016).
28The elimination of atypical choice outcomes is akin to the restricting the analysis to “quasi
regular” (Oxtoby, 1952) or “nontrivial invariant” sets (Billingsley, 1995), i.e. to sets of states of
the world that are aperiodic and recurrent, in the terminology of the theory of ergodic stochastic
processes. States in this set are visited with positive probability in the limit. The implicit assump-
tion here is that the initial “burn-in” period of the Markov chain that generates the sequence of
pre-selected sets has been transcended.
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5 Results
5.1 Estimation of Pre-Selection Model
Table 6 present estimation results for the model of GP level pre-selection. The table
presents both, the estimates of the constrained choice model, with the cost function
specified as c(z) = exp(z′τ), and for comparison estimates of a linear probability
model absent cost constraints. The former is estimated by Maximum Simulated
Likelihood, with the unobservables (to the econometrician) in the GP pre-selection
model {µij, j ∈ J } being i.i.d. draws from a standard normal distribution.29
The results of both models are qualitatively similar with regard to the hospital
attributes included in xc - distance and waiting time - and x
a - HSMR and MFF.
They show that distance is the dominant hospital attribute in the GPs’ pre-selection
of hospitals into J a. GPs tend to pre-select closer hospitals. The coefficient on dis-
tance is about four times as large as the second most important attributes, the
market forces factor (MFF).30 The MFF also weighs negatively on the GP’s inclu-
sion decision, as does hospital quality, measured by the hospital’s HSMR. If HSMR
were regarded as fully controlling for hospital quality of care, then it could be ar-
gued that the negative effect of the MFF would suggest that GPs tend to refer to
hospitals that are cheaper from the point of view of the local Primary Care Trust.
This finding suggests that GPs to some extent internalize the costs of their referrals
that fall on PCT budgets. This finding complements research on the implementa-
tion of GP fundholding reforms in the early 1990s that found that altruism is not an
important motive of GPs and that direct financial incentives are required to induce
GPs to take account of the externalities their referrals create (Croxson et al. (2001),
Dusheiko et al. (2006)). This finding is also important in light of the recent changes
to the institutional design of the NHS. With the formation of Clinical Commis-
sioning Groups following the Health and Social Care Act (2012), GPs have greater
responsibility for budgets. These changes have likely sharpened the incentives for
29See Appendix C.3 for details.
30If GPs took account of distances between the patient’s LSOA (instead of GP practice) and hos-
pital sites so that the distance variable would be measured with error, then results by Griliches and
Ringstad (1970) about measurement error in nonlinear models imply that our distance coefficient
estimate is biased towards zero, so the true distance effect is even stronger.
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GPs to take account of financial implications of their referral decisions.
The results show that specifying the pre-selection model properly affects the
relative importance of explanatory variables. The effect of quality relative to waiting
times is bigger in the constrained model than in the unconstrained model. In the
constrained model, hospitals are ranked relative to one another and included up to
the marginal hospital, and our estimates show that the cutoff is driven more by
quality than waiting time. In the unconstrained model, on the other hand, every
hospital is evaluated only on its own merits and is potentially the marginal hospital.
And when each hospital is considered in isolation, waiting time appears a more
dominant attribute than quality.
The linear probability model does not constrain the cardinality of the pre-selected
choice set. In contrast to that, the constrained pre-selection model does. Its esti-
mates show that the cost of including choice alternatives in J a is driven predomi-
nantly by the GP practice size in terms of number of GPS at the practice. The larger
the practice, the lower the cost of including hospitals into the pre-selected choice
sets. As discussed earlier, one may not be able to entirely rule out the presence of
measurement error in the construction of consideration sets. If this measurement
error were correlated with practice size, then the coefficient on the number of GPs
at the practice level would be biased upward in absolute value. The homogeneity of
the patient pool at the GP practice level in terms of age plays a role as well, albeit
a more muted one. The estimates show that practices with a more homogeneous
patient pool in terms of age, i.e. with a lower coefficient of variation for patient age,
face higher costs of, or lower net benefits from, including hospitals into J a.
A key policy issue is how demand responds when hospital attributes change.
While this can be easily and unambiguously assessed at the patient level - because
patients make a binary choice -, responses at the GP level cannot be unambiguously
assessed because GPs make choices on sets of hospital alternatives, and these choices
involve both, the ranking of hospital alternatives and the marginal contribution of a
hospital to the valuation of the set of highest ranking hospital alternatives. So the
GP level response will depend on whether the hospital whose attributes changes is
or is not a marginal hospital in the GP’s choice of pre-selected set. Appendix C.4
provides details of the various cases that can arise.
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From the estimation of the pre-selection model, we retain those draws µij that
are consistent with the bounds (C − 4) identified through the GP’s pre-selection
outcomes. These are estimates of residual hospital quality at the GP level.
5.2 Patient Level Choice
The patient level hospital choice model is specified as a multinomial logit model.
Next to xc - residual distance and waiting time -, the model includes, as x
p, the
number of parking spaces at the hospital as an amenity that is considered by the
patient, but not the GP.
At the level of actual patient choice, waiting time is treated as potentially en-
dogenous. Indeed, patients may face longer waiting times at higher quality hospitals
that are popular with, and chosen by, many patients; a regression of waiting times
on mortality rates (HSMR) and the exogenous hospital attributes yields a statis-
tically significant negative coefficient. The analysis therefore employs the control
function approach (Blundell and Powell (2003), Petrin and Train (2010)), including
the residuals from the regression of waiting times on HSMR and exogenous hospital
attributes (wait res) among the hospital attributes. This approach is valid because,
absent parametric restrictions across the GP and patient parts of the model, the
GP level pre-selection model – that uses HSMR among the hospital attributes – can
be estimated separately,31 while HSMR is excluded from the patient level hospital
choice model.32
To control for the effect of pre-selection our estimates of residual hospital quality,
the residuals backed out from the pre-selection model estimations, {µˆij, j ∈ J ai }, are
also included. To the extent that GPs convey to patients any quality information
about the pre-selected hospitals that does not only factor into the GPs’ pre-selection,
but also into patients’ choice decisions, e.g. through patients’ own quality assess-
ments, these residuals would be expected to show up statistically significant in the
patient level choice model.
31The model by Gaynor et al. (2016) exhibits the same separability property.
32We also considered the number of A&E admissions and the fraction of A&E admissions that ex-
ceeded the 4-hour waiting time target as possible instruments. However, this data is only available
at the Trust level, and some Trusts have multiple hospital sites with an A&E department.
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Table 7 presents coefficient and elasticity estimates of the patient level hospital
choice model, conditional on the choice sets pre-selected by the patient’s GP. Both
sets of residuals, from the constrained pre-selection and the unconstrained linear
probability model, are accounted for.
In line with the the existing hospital choice literature (e.g. Beckert et al. (2012),
Beckert and Kelly (2017), Gaynor et al. (2016)), distance - albeit to be interpreted as
residual distance - is the dominant hospital attribute from the patient’s perspective.
Waiting times are also found to be substantively and statistically significant.
The magnitude of the waiting time elasticity is smaller than the one reported by
Sivey (2012). Our preferred waiting time coefficient estimate of -0.6189 implies that
a change in waiting time by 3 months, i.e. about 3 standard deviations, results in a
demand reduction on the order of 1.86 percent. Sivey (2012) reports an estimate of
demand being reduced by 5 percent.
We note that our finding on waiting time is also shared with Beckert et al. (2012)
and Beckert and Kelly (2017), but Gaynor et al., in their analysis of coronary artery
bypass graft surgery, find no or positive waiting time effects. The result that the first-
stage residuals from the regression of waiting times on HSMR enter as statistically
significant into the model is novel and establishes the endogeneity of waiting times.
We now turn to the role of patients’ perception of residual hospital quality in
their choice from the pre-selected set. The residuals obtained from the constrained
pre-selection model appear insignificant in the patient level model. This means that
there is no correlation between µij and ζij, i.e. between patients’ and GPs’ quality
assessment unobserved by the econometrician.
This is not what we would necessarily expect. For example, if both a distant and
a nearby hospital are pre-selected by the GP, then the negative effect of distance on
utility implies that the residual quality of the distant hospital is higher than that of
the nearby hospital, and the GP conveys this to the patient via the inclusion of the
distant hospital in the pre-selected set. Our model allows patients to take account of
such differences in residual quality. Our estimates, however, show that such residual
quality differences do not affect patients’ choices.
One interpretation of this finding is that patients perceive all hospitals included
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by the GP in the pre-selected set as of sufficiently high quality, and that any variation
in residual quality above that threshold is irrelevant to them. This is consistent
with qualitative evidence that patients themselves to not take quality in account
(Dixon and Robertson (2009)). This finding supports the modelling strategy that
patients defer to GPs with regard to hospital quality. And it supports the estimation
strategy by which the GP level pre-selection and the patient level choice models can
be estimated separately without bias provided the coefficients on xc are allowed to
differ between patient and GP. As discussed earlier, joint estimation is required if
the model imposes a parametric restriction across the GP and patient parts of the
model.
The residuals from the linear probability model do enter the model as statistically
significant, with a positive coefficient. But the reason for this finding is that these
residuals can be thought of as embedding a hospital fixed effect which is proportional
to the fraction of GP practices that include a given hospital in the set J a of pre-
selected hospitals. Hence, the residuals from the linear probability model merely
capture the frequency with which hospitals are offered, and more frequently offered
hospitals are more likely to be chosen.33 Beckert et al. (2012) report a similar result.
34 This also explains the slightly higher value of the log likelihood function in the
model using this set of residuals.
Finally, Table 8 presents the same two multinomial logit specifications without
conditioning on J a and, instead, simply considering the set of the fifteen nearest
hospitals as the patient’s choice set. Comparing these with the results from the
models that condition on J a, as in Table 7, it is seen that the residual distance
effect and the residual distance elasticity are overestimated in absolute value. The
reason is that distance was seen to be the dominant pre-selection criterion on the part
of the GP. Therefore, non-selected hospitals, among the 15 nearest in J \ J a, tend
to be more distant on average, and in estimation the low choice incidence of distant
hospitals among patients induces a large (in absolute value) estimate of the distance
33For example, consider hospitals A,B, and C in GP1’s consideration set, and hospitals C,D and
E in GP2’s consideration set; suppose, GP1 selects B and C, and GP2 selects C and D. Then the
FE for C is higher than for B and D, simply because it is in both GPs’ consideration set, even if
GP1 ranks B higher than C and GP2 ranks D higher than C. Everything else equal, the FE for C
is twice the FE for B and D, respectively.
34See their Table 1, which reports a positive coefficient on GP referral frequency.
27
coefficient. At the same time, the waiting time effect is slightly underestimated
compared to the model that conditions on J a. This may be explained by the fact
that patients, when facing a set J a of nearby, roughly equidistant hospitals of similar
quality pre-selected by the GP, prefer hospitals with shorter waiting times. Finally,
the effect of amenities, like parking, is not identified. While they are known to
matter to patients (Dixon and Robertson (2009), Goldman and Romley (2008)),
their effect risks being diluted when patient and GP are collapsed into a seemingly
sole decision making entity. So, on the basis of the plausibility of the substantive
findings, this model does worse than the comparator model that conditions on J a.
Comparing the purely statistical performance of the patient level choice models
with the residuals from the constrained GP pre-selection model, the model condi-
tioning on J a exhibits a substantially higher log-likelihood function than the one
conditioning on J . In terms of its ability to predict, the proportion of correctly
predicted choices, 0.74, is about as high as the one of the model conditioning on
J , 0.75. So the statistical metrics corroborate our preference for the model that
conditions on the GP level pre-selected set J a and the imputed residuals from the
constrained GP pre-selection model.
In summary, our analysis may caution against ignoring, and simplistic modelling,
of strategic pre-selection of choice sets, especially in the class of logit models popular
with applied researchers.
6 Conclusions
This paper considers the microeconometric analysis of GP / patient choice processes
in which the ultimate beneficiary of the choice outcome, the patient in the role of
the principal, is advised by a GP, the principal’s agent, through the GP’s strategic
pre-selection of a choice set for the patient. The paper presents a specific application
to hospital choice for an elective procedure, hip replacements, in the setting of the
English NHS. The empirical analysis illuminates the biases and inconsistencies that
may result from ignoring the strategic pre-selection of choice sets on the part of
the agent. Our analysis offers a refined perspective on the impact of distances and
waiting times, distinguishing their contributions to GP pre-selection and patient
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choice, and unlike many conventional models it identifies the effect of attributes
that for many patients shape their perioperative experience, like amenities.
The results of the two-stage model show that GPs, in their role as agent of the
patient, consider hospital quality when offering choice alternatives to patients, along
with other attributes like distance and waiting times that patients are known to
care about. However, the results also show that patients do not care about residual
hospital quality differences and, instead, focus on attributes such as amenities that
for them are tangible and relevant, but are unlikely to be considered by GPs.
Furthermore, the results provide evidence that GPs to some extent internalize
costs of referrals that fall on PCT budgets. They respond to some incentives, like
the MFF, that arise from their other role as agent of health authorities and the need
to manage a budget for provision of care for the whole local population. The finding
that GPs respond to financial incentives during the period when PCTs had the
legal responsibility for NHS budgets is novel, points to potential conflicts of interest
on the part of GPs, and as such is important for policy makers and potentially
controversial.
It is worth noting in this regard that the NHS went broadly through three fund-
ing regime: (1) the fund holding period (1991-1999)35, the PCT period which we
study, and the subsequent period, from 2013, with CCGs replacing PCTs. In the
CCG period, policy pressures on GP are likely the highest across the three regimes,
particularly with regard to finance, so that the patient-physician agency relationship
can be expected to be even weaker. So the fact that we find that GPs respond to
financial incentives in the period when policy pressures were weakest implies that
GPs conflict of interest and influence of choice set pre-selection in the other two
periods can be expected to be even stronger.
There are at least five policy implications of this finding. First, in a system that
promises equal access for equal need, heterogeneity in referral patterns across GPs
as a consequence of the idiosyncratic incentives they face needs to be monitored.
Indeed, it may raise the question whether there ought to be some national guidance
35During the fund holding period, GPs could personally benefit from referral decisions. Studies of
the fund holding period into GPs budgetary responsibilities (Dusheiko et al. (2006), and Dusheiko
et al. (2007)) show that the patient-physician agency relationship was weak, i.e. GPs do not act
solely in the interest of patients.
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with regard to referral advice, once a referral is deemed necessary (an assessment
that may result from a referral management system).
Second, to the extent that patients may concentrate at hospitals that GPs favour
to bolster up local trusts, irrespective of hospital quality, such patterns would tend
to produce worse health outcomes. That would be problematic in its own right. And
it would be an even bigger concern if it were to affect the most vulnerable patients.
Third, to the extent that GPs conflicts of interest are more acute in the current
CCG regime, it would be worth monitoring whether GP led choice diversion is
further accelerated.
Fourth, our results stress that GPs operate as businesses, and as such they face
a range of incentives, from financial to non-financial ones. The latter may include
their reputation with patients, with consultants, with health administrators; their
day-to-day work load, etc.; and these non-financial incentives may be as strong as,
if not stronger than, the financial ones we quantify in our study. Hence, the general
finding that GPs are imperfect agents of their patients can be expected to hold
irrespective of the particular funding arrangements that GPs operate under. Of
course, the converse may also be true: In a competitive fee-for-service market, GPs
may be too lenient in their gatekeeper role; see for example the study by Markussen
and Røed (2017) of the Norwegian market for paid sick leave in this Journal, or
Brekke et al. (2017). For this reason, we concur with Siciliani et al. (2017) in that
policy design needs to take the role of the GP into account, and it needs to do so
within the specific context of the respective health care funding architecture.
Fifth, the results could be of interest to policy makers because of their impact
on competition in the health care sector. They show that GPs make some fairly
complex trade-offs, which would suggest they shape competition in publicly funded
health care services, equilibrating between excessive quality competition in a fixed-
price system and excessive price competition at the expense of quality. In fact,
this is in line with how hospitals appear to interact with GPs, as conduits to pa-
tients. Merger investigations by the UK competition authority, for example, have
found evidence of hospitals focusing their marketing efforts on GPs. For example,
in Royal Bournemouth and Christchurch Hospital NHS Foundation Trust / Poole
Hospital NHS Foundation Trust merger inquiry (2013), the Competition Commis-
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sion found that the merging parties had strategies to engage with GPs via a GP
newsletter. Those examples are consistent with evidence from the Cooperation and
Competition Panel of hospitals responding to competitive incentives in a variety of
ways, including proactive GP engagement. Recognising the pivotal role of GPs in
the competitive make-up of the NHS funded health care architecture in England,
researchers have used qualitative methods to try to understand what drives GPs’
choices. The analysis in this paper, to our knowledge, is among the first to formally
model the role of GPs and quantify their incentives and their impact on patient
choice outcomes.
We close by suggesting potential avenues of future research. Our analysis is
limited by the data available to us: Neither the GPs’ consideration sets, nor the
patients’ true choice sets are unambiguously observed; future research would benefit
from data that encompass information on the set of alternatives that GPs consider
and the actual sets of alternatives that are being discussed with each patient. Given
our data limitations, we assume that pre-selected choice sets are tailored to a hybrid
patient, i.e. they are uniform across patients at a GP practice; this is practicable in
our situation, but with less limited data, our methodology could be adapted to allow
for pre-selected sets that are tailored to each patient. Future research might also
explore the role of GPs in the choice of NHS funded patients between public and
private providers, notably in light of different capacity and performance metrics, in
terms of breadth and depth, published by the two types of hospitals. It might also be
useful to investigate whether GPs’ financial incentives have strengthened since CCG
are in control of budgets. And it might be interesting to see whether “disruptive
entrants” into the health care sector, such as Artificial Intelligence harvesting big
data to predict outcomes36, fundamentally alter the patient – provider relationship.
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Appendices
A Tables and Figures
Table 1: Hospital Attributes
Waiting
timea
Residual
Distance b
HSMRc MFFd Parkinge
Min 3 0.11 0.71 0.93 0
Lower Quartile 75 20.15 0.93 0.96 241
Median 93 37.20 1.02 0.97 376
Upper Quartile 108.5 64.23 1.06 1.06 545
Max 204 411.09 1.25 1.20 3215
Std. Dev 29.66 50.33 0.10 0.07 385.67
Source: HES and Health and Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC). 168 NHS hospital sites. a Median waiting
time, calculated from HES inpatient records, at site level, in days. b Residual distances are straight line distances
between the patient’s LSOA and the postcode of the NHS hospital site in the patient’s GP’s pre-selected choice set.
c Hospital standardized mortality ratio, at Trust level. d Market Forces Factor, at Trust level. e Number of parking
spaces, at site level.
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Table 2: GP Practice Attributes
Coeff. of Var. Mean Patient Consideration Pre-selected Number
w.r.t. Agea Ageb Set Distancec Set Distanced of GPs
Min 5.16 . 0.11 0.11 1
Lower Quartile 13.27 60.5 16.56 5.15 3
Median 19.22 66.33 31.08 11.33 4
Upper Quartile 28.37 70.97 56.11 23.26 7
Max 50.13 96 411.09 317.04 21
Std. Dev. . 11.34 44.62 23.42 3.06
Source: HES and Health and Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC). Based in 4,721 GP practices, selected as described
in B. a The coefficient of variation w.r.t. age is the standard deviation, divided by the mean, of patient age at the GP
practice level, in percent. b Mean patient age is calculated at practice level. c Distances are average straight line distances,
in km, to NHS hospitals in GP consideration sets. d Distances are straight line distances, in km, between practice postcode
and NHS hospitals in pre-selected sets.
Table 3: Number of Hospitals Referred to, at GP Practice Level
# Freq. Percent Cum.
1 2,037 43.15 43.15
2 1,633 34.59 77.74
3 703 14.89 92.63
4 253 5.36 97.99
5 75 1.59 99.58
6 18 0.38 99.96
7 2 0.04 100.00
Total 4,721 100.00
Source: HES.
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Table 4: Taxonomy of Choice Models: Who observes, resp. considers,
what?
symbols variable GP patient
indirect utility
vij

xaj MFF X not cons.
HSMR X not cons.
... X not cons.
uij

xcij distance X X
wait.time X X
xpij parking not cons. X
... not cons. X
ξij unobs. X
cost
z GPs X not rel.
Coeff.Var.Age X not rel.
Constrained Pre-Selection: vij – benefit of hospital j for patient i, as evaluated by i’s GP; uij – patient
i’s indirect conditional utility of hospital j; ξij – GP’s incomplete information: hospital attributes relevant
to patient i, but unobserved by patient i’s GP. Variable classification. MFF: market forces factor; HSMR:
Hospital standardised mortality ratio.
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Table 5: Taxonomy of Econometric Model: Who observes, resp. considers,
what?
symbols variable GP patient econometrician
indirect utility
αij

xaj MFF X not cons. X
HSMR X not cons. X
δij

xcij distance X X X
wait.time X X X
xpij parking not cons. X X
µij
{
µaj X not rel. unobs.
ζij
{
µcij X X unobs.
ξcij = ξij unobs. X unobs.
µpij not cons. X unobs.
ξpij not cons. X unobs.
ij = µ
p
ij + ξ
p
ij not rel. X unobs.
cost
z GPs X not rel. X
Coeff.Var.Age X not rel. X
Constrained Pre-Selection: Notation as detailed in Appendix C.2. Variable classification. MFF: market
forces factor; HSMR: Hospital standardised mortality ratio.
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Table 6: GP Pre-Selection
Constrained Choicea Unconstr. Linear Prob. Modelb
Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err.
distance -0.0666∗∗∗ 0.0007 -.0721∗∗∗ .0012
mff -0.0173∗∗∗ 0.0005 -.0255∗∗∗ .0017
hsmr -0.0150∗∗∗ 0.0033 -.0074∗∗∗ .0017
waiting time -0.01207∗∗∗ 0.0005 -.01468∗∗∗ .0012
const .1259∗∗∗ .0012
σ 0.0876∗∗∗ 0.0008
τ0 -0.1939
∗∗∗ 0.0003
GPs -0.3649∗∗∗ 0.0010
Coeff. of Var. w.r.t. Age -0.0299∗∗∗ 0.0009
HES and Health and Social Care Information Centre (HSCIC).
∗∗∗ significant at 1 percent level; ∗∗ significant at 5 percent level; ∗ significant at 10 percent level. All regressors are
standardized. mff: market forces factor, at Trust level; hsmr: hospital standardised mortality rate, at Trust level. a
Constrained GP level pre-selection model, based on C-4; details in Appendix C.2.3 and C.3. b Unconstrained linear
probability model; estimated by OLS.
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Table 7: Patient Hospital Choice, Conditional on J a
Residuals from Constrained Choice Model Residuals from Unconstrained Linear Prob. Model
Coefficient Estimates
Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err.
residual distance -1.9992∗∗∗ 0.0409 -2.5540∗∗∗ 0.1431
parking 0.0218∗∗ 0.0118 0.0248∗∗ 0.0118
waiting time -0.6189∗∗∗ 0.0831 -.5932∗∗∗ 0.0832
wait resa 0.0246∗∗∗ 0.0028 0.0208∗∗∗ 0.0029
constr resb -0.0389 0.0343
unconstr resc 6.423∗∗∗ 1.577
log lik -16315.218 -16307.72
MSPEd 0.74 0.79
Elasticity Estimates
Elasticitye Std.Err.f Elasticitye Std.Err.f
residual distance -1.879 1.912 -2.443 2.455
waiting time -1.811 0.600 -1.740 0.674
parking 0.023 0.021 0.027 0.025
Notes: Conditional Logit model estimates, conditional on GP level pre-selected choice sets, J a. ∗∗∗ significant at 1 percent level; ∗∗ significant at 5 percent level; ∗
significant at 10 percent level. The regressors dist, parking and waiting time are standardized; a wait res: residual from 1st stage regression of waiting times on hospital
quality measures. b Constrained residuals imputed from GP pre-selection model. d Mean square prediction error, which corresponds to the fraction of correctly predicted
choices. c Unconstrained residuals obtained from linear probability model for GP pre-selection. e Mean estimated elasticity. f Empirical standard error of estimated
elasticities.
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Table 8: Patient Hospital Choice, Conditional on J
Residuals from Constrained Choice Model Residuals from Unconstrained Linear Prob. Model
Coefficient Estimates
Coeff. Std.Err. Coeff. Std.Err.
residual distance -6.6719∗∗∗ 0.0499 -2.9645∗∗∗ 0.0939
parking 0.0137 0.0093 0.0308 0.0123
waiting time -0.2095∗∗∗ 0.0669 -0.5211∗∗∗ 0.0889
wait resa 0.0107∗∗∗ 0.0022 0.0175∗∗∗ 0.0030
constr resb -0.0118 0.0314
unconstr resc 11.0478∗∗∗ 0.9466
log lik -27543.777 -24250.632
MSPEd 0.75 0.71
Elasticity Estimates
Elasticitye Std.Err.f Elasticitye Std.Err.f
residual distance -6.383 6.414 -2.982 2.995
waiting time -0.614 0.225 -1.531 0.599
parking 0.015 0.014 0.033 0.030
Notes: Conditional Logit model estimates, conditional on choice sets comprising 15 hospitals closest to patient, calJ . ∗∗∗ significant at 1 percent level; ∗∗ significant at
5 percent level; ∗ significant at 10 percent level. The regressors dist, parking and waiting time are standardized; a wait res: residual from 1st stage regression of waiting
times on hospital quality measures. b Constrained residuals imputed from GP pre-selection model. d Mean square prediction error, which corresponds to the fraction of
correctly predicted choices. c Unconstrained residuals obtained from linear probability model for GP pre-selection. e Mean estimated elasticity. f Empirical standard
error of estimated elasticities.
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Figure 1: MFF Spread at GP Practice Level
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Notes: The MFF spread is defined as the difference between maximum and minimum
MFF among hospitals in the GP practice’s consideration set. The minimum MFF
across all GP practices is 0.929279, while the maximum MFF is 1.202005.
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Figure 2: Consideration Set Sizes at GP Practice Level
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Notes: The minimum number of hospitals considered at any GP practice is 7.
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B Selection of GP Sample
This appendix provides details on how the sample of 4,721 GPs was selected.
There are 7,966 GP practices in our data that refer patients with relevant HRGs
(healthcare resource groups). Of these, only 5,209 GP practices refer patients with
the relevant TFCs (treatment function codes). Of these, 99.88% (i.e. all but 6) refer
to no more than 7 hospitals. These are large practices with more than 30 GPs. They
are neither typical of our sample of practices nor for the population of practices over
the 2011/12 period we study (Kelly and Stoye (2014)) and therefore excluded.
Consider the consideration set definition according to the algorithm described in
the Identification section of the paper. We start with 418 sites in our data. For 198
sites we have full attributes data (incl. amenities, e.g. parking etc.). For 189 sites we
also have a provider MFF and HSMR. For 182 in addition we have (median) waiting
time. Of these, 168 are in the GPs’ consideration sets, i.e. the respective GP is in
at least one of these hospitals’ catchment area. There are 196 GP practices that are
not in any of these hospitals’ catchment areas. This leaves 5,007 GP practices that
are in the catchment areas of the 168 hospitals.
These GPs have 50,497 hip replacement patients. Of these, some choose sites
that are not in the GPs’ consideration sets (e.g. sites that are dropped because there
are no attributes, or distant site, etc.). And some GP practices have fewer than 15
hospitals in their consideration sets (see Figure 2).
267 GP practices refer only to more distant hospitals than the 15 closest in their
consideration sets. 19 GPs have only patients who choose hospitals that are not
in the GPs’ consideration sets because the GPs are not in the respective hospitals’
catchment areas. Eliminating these GP practices results in our sample of 4,721 GP
practices.
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C Econometric Model Specification
We start with a description of the micro-theoretic modelling approach to the GP’s
pre-selection problem. We then turns to the econometric specification of this GP
pre-selection model and of the patient level choice model.
C.1 Micro-theoretic Modelling Approach to GP Pre-Selection
The model proposed in this section encompasses costs of information acquisition and
dissemination. Such costs are low for “experts” such as GPs, but high for “laymen”
such as patients. They thereby create a role for the former to pre-select choice sets
out of the universe of choice alternatives for the benefit of the latter. The model
shows how misalignment of incentives between GP and patients leads to different
sets of hospitals to choose from. This can be interpreted as an inefficiency in the
choice process, in that it induces a divergence between the distribution of choice
outcomes under pre-selection and the distribution of choice outcomes in the absence
of information costs. It also shows that, to the extent that the GP does not have
complete information about the patients’ evaluation criteria and does not tailor the
pre-selected choice sets to the idiosyncratic evaluation outcomes of the patient, but
instead offers a uniform choice sets to all patients, a further divergence is introduced,
enhancing the level of inefficiency of the choice process.
Let uij denote patient i’s indirect conditional utility of hospital alternative j,
and vij the benefit assessment of hospital j for patient i from the perspective of
patient i’s agent (GP). The valuations uij and vij may differ for two reasons. First,
patients and GP may evaluate different sets of attributes of hospital j. For example,
GPs have access to hospital quality information that patients either do not have or
find difficult to interpret. And they may reflect incentives the GP faces as agent of
health authorities, e.g. with regard to financial implications captured by the MFF.
We label such hospital attributes by xaj . Patients may pay attention to hospital
amenities that do not matter to GPs. Such hospital attributes are labelled by xpij.
Hospital attributes considered by both, GP and patient, are labelled by xcij; they
include, for example, distance and waiting time. The misalignment assumptions with
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regard to GP and patient evaluation criteria imposed in this model are justified in
Section 4.2.
Second, some of the attributes that matter to patients may not be observed by
the GP, i.e. GPs may have incomplete information about the full set of evaluation
criteria relevant to patients. We label such unobservables to the GP by ξij. The
term ξin could represent, for example, that someone among patient i’s family and
friends did, or did not, endorse hospital j; the patient’s GP may not know about
this, and indeed the patient may not want to divulge this, for fear of appearing
prejudiced. This incomplete information assumption is necessary to motivate that
GPs are imperfect agents for patients. As a consequence, they present a set of
options, rather than simply making a choice on behalf of patients. It is for this
reason that governments mandate choice.
As a reference for this subsection, the columns labelled “GP” and “patient” of
Table 4 summarize the (mis-)alignment structure of the micro-theoretic GP and
patient models and the GP’s incomplete information. It encapsulates the micro-
theoretic model of patient i’s GP’s valuation of hospital j,
vij = αij + ξij = x
a′
j θa + x
c′
ijθc + ξij,
and the micro-theoretic model of the patient’s valuation,
uij = δij = x
c′
ijθc + x
p′
j θp,
where θa, θc and θp are parameter vectors that capture the sensitivity of valuations
to the respective hospital attributes.
Turn now to the GP’s problem of pre-selecting the composition of the set of
hospitals J ai for patient i to choose from, out of the set J of all hospitals that i’s
GP considers. Suppose that, from the GP’s perspective, there is a unit cost C > 0
of including a hospital alternative into J ai . This cost may be specific to the GP. For
example, in the context of hospital choice in the UK where a GP (practice) plays
the role of the patient’s agent, this cost might be expected to be a convex function
c(z) of practice level patient heterogeneity and the number of GPs in the practice.
It imposes a constraint that can be thought of as the effort the GP needs to exert in
order to explain the features, pros and cons of the alternative to the patient. This
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perspective on GP decision making is supported by qualitative evidence (Rosen et
al. (2007)).
Let P denote the set of all subsets of J , i.e. P = {G ⊂ J : #G ≤ #J }. The
value of any candidate set G of hospitals for patient i from the GP’s perspective is
E [maxj∈G(vij + ξij)], net of the cost of including the hospitals in the set, c(z)#G.
If the unobservables ξij are i.i.d. extreme value with location parameter zero and
scale parameter σ, then the gross benefit of the set G is the inclusive value of G in
the terminology of the discrete choice literature,
IG(xci ,x
a) = E
[
max
j∈G
(vij + ξij)
]
= ln
(∑
j∈G
exp
(vij
σ
))
,
where xci = [x
c
ij]j∈G, and
J ai = arg maxG∈P {IG(x
c
i ,x
a)− c(z)#G} .
The solution to this problem is to rank hospital alternatives in J in terms of vij
and to choose the highest ranked alternatives, up to the point where the marginal
contribution to E [maxj∈G vij] of the next ranked hospital is less than the marginal
cost of its inclusion, c(z), i.e.
IJ ai ∪{j}(x
c
i ,x
a)− IJ ai (xci ,xa) < c(z) ∀j ∈ J \ J ai
IJ ai (x
c
i ,x
a)− IJ ai \{j}(xci ,xa) ≥ c(z) ∀j ∈ J ai . (C-1)
It is at this stage of pre-selection that the distinction between the GP as ex-
pert agent and the patient, as layman principal, emerges and can be defined: The
GP (expert) has sufficient information and expertise to establish a ranking of the
alternatives in J , while the patient (layman) does not; for laymen, the cost of es-
tablishing such a ranking are likely to be prohibitive. This distinction is an implicit
assumption in the present setup. The distinction creates a role for the GP, namely
to pre-select, and thereby narrow down, the set of choice alternatives in order to
render the patient’s choice problem less complex and more tractable.
The set J ai resulting from the GP’s pre-selection may differ, however, from the
one that would be chosen if the assessment were based on uij (encompassing x
c
i
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and xpi ), instead of vij (encompassing x
c
i and x
a), i.e. if the patient’s and GP’s
assessment criteria were perfectly aligned, in the sense that they were to consider
the same set of attributes of the choice alternatives as decision relevant. Denote
the choice set that would have been pre-selected on the basis of {uij} by J pi . The
efficiency loss due to pre-selection by the GP can then be cast as
∆i = IJ (xci ,x
p
i )− IJ ai (xci ,xpi )
= IJ (xci ,x
p
i )− IJ pi (xci ,x
p
i ) + IJ pi (x
c
i ,x
p
i )− IJ ai (xci ,xpi ).
The first term captures the efficiency loss due to the reduction in complexity of the
choice problem, while the second term captures the additional efficiency loss arising
from a misalignment of assessment criteria between patient and GP which results
in a choice set J ai which may be suboptimal when evaluated on the basis of the
attributes xci and x
p relevant to patient i.
The pre-selected choice sets J ai vary across patients i, to the extent that the at-
tributes considered by both, GP and patient, xcij, vary with i; e.g. distance between
i and hospital j. In practice, the GP may pre-select a uniform choice set J a at the
outset on the basis of xa and xc as they relate to the “average patient” and then
offer this set to all patients at the practice. This wedge between the pre-selected
choice set based on average attributes, rather than those specific to i, introduces yet
another layer of potential inefficiency into the choice mechanism, so that the total
inefficiency across all patients i at a GP practice can be measured by
∆ =
∑
i
[
IJ a(xci ,x
p
i )− IJ ai (xci ,xpi ) + ∆i
]
.
C.2 Econometric Choice Model
This section describes the econometric model specifications of the patient level choice
model and the GP level pre-selection model. It details the econometrician’s incom-
plete information about various model components and describes how this informa-
tion structure can give rise to econometric selection biases.
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C.2.1 Econometric Specification: The Patient’s Choice Problem
As above and in Table 4, let xcij denote hospital j’s attributes that are taken into
account by both, GP and patient; xpij those that only matter to the patient; and x
a
j
those that only matter to the GP, in the role of the patient’s agent. For simplicity,
suppose that patient and GP attach the same weights (coefficients) θc to x
c
ij, and
specify
δij = x
c′
ijθc + x
p′
ijθp,
where θc and θp are parameter vectors. The indirect utility of alternative j to patient
i, latent to the econometrician, is then
u?ij = δij + ζij + ij = x
c′
ijθc + x
p′
ijθp + ζij + ij,
where ζij and ij are errors unobserved by the econometrician. The decomposition
of the econometric error into ζij and ij and how it relates to the econometric errors
in the GP model is explained below.
Let Yij be a binary indicator taking value one if i chooses alternative j, i.e.
if u?ij = max{u?ik, k ∈ J ai }, and zero otherwise. Condition on the set of hospital
alternatives J ai pre-selected by the GP.37 Under the assumption that the errors pij
are i.i.d. type 1 extreme value and assuming that patient i takes the pre-selected
choice set J ai as given38, conditional on ζ ′i = [ζij]j∈J ,
Pr(Yij = 1|J ai , ζi) =
exp(δij + ζij)∑
k∈J ai exp(δik + ζik)
, j ∈ J ai
= 0 j 6∈ J ai .
Except for the unobserved ζijs, this is a conventional logit model with choice set J ai .
C.2.2 Econometric Specification: The GP’s Selection Problem
Recall that the GP’s assessment of i’s valuation of alternative j, is v?ij = αij + ξij,
where αij = x
c′
ijθc+x
a
jθa is a linear function of x
c
ij and x
a
j , θa is a vector of parameters,
37In the general setting of this subsection, J ai may depend on i, to the extent that the agent
wholly espouses the attributes that principal i values and that these vary with i, e.g. distance.
38This amounts to assuming that the patient behaves non-strategically and does not question
how the GP arrived at the pre-selection outcome J ai .
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and ξij is an error term. It relates to the error term in the patient’s model as
follows. Suppose that the error term ζij in the patient’s valuation model u
?
ij can
be decomposed into uncertainty µcij + ξ
c
ij with regard to the attributes taken into
account by both, patient and GP,
ζij = µ
c
ij + ξ
c
ij,
while the remaining uncertainty with regard to attributes that only matter to the
patient is captured by µpij + ξ
p
ij = ij. Here, µ
c
ij and µ
p
ij are those parts of the
econometrician’s uncertainty about the two parts of δij that are known to the GP,
while ξcij and ξ
p
ij are unknown to both, GP and econometrician. From the perspective
of the GP who cares only about the utility contribution related to xci , only the former
matters. So, ξij = ξ
c
ij. Consequently, from the perspective of the econometrician, in
the model for the GP, µcij matters in addition to ξij = ξ
c
ij.
To facilitate an overview of the information and consideration structure of this
model as it relates to the GP, patient and econometrician, Table 5 provides an tax-
onomy of the components of the econometric model. It encapsulates the econometric
version of the information structure of the mirco-theoretic model presented in Table
4 above.
Assuming, as above, the ξij are i.i.d. extreme value with location parameter
zero and scale parameter σ, the distribution of choice outcomes from the GP’s
perspective is given by logit choice probabilities based on attributes xc and xa.
Denote the econometrician’s incomplete information about the GP (agent) specific
relevant attributes xa by µaj . Once the {ξij}i∈J are integrated out, the econometri-
cian’s remaining uncertainty with regard to the agent’s assessment of alternative j
is therefore µij = µ
c
ij +µ
a
j . The solution to the GP’s optimization problem is defined
by
J ai = arg maxG∈P {IG(x
c
i ,x
a, µi)− c(z)#G} . (C-2)
Analogous to C-1, the solution yields bounds on cost,
U(αi, µi) ≤ c(z) ≤ U(αi, µi) (C-3)
where αi = (αij, j ∈ J ) and µi = (µij, j ∈ J ). Appendix C.2.3 provides formal
derivations.
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Note that, considering just the GP level pre-selection of choice sets as the first
part of the entire, two-stage choice model, the inequalities above allow moment based
estimation of the set of values of C = c(z) consistent with the above inequalities, next
to the parameters in αij, using the methodology proposed in Pakes et al. (2011) and
applied in Ishii (2005). In the present instance, moments are obtained by integrating
out {µim,m ∈ J ai } in the upper bounds, and in addition {µij, j 6∈ J ai } in the lower
bounds. The setting differs from the one in Ishii (2005) in that in her work only the
cardinality of the optimal set is chosen, while here in addition the specific elements
of the optimal set are determined.39
Notice also that this model of GP pre-selection is reminiscent of the one proposed
by Mehta et al. (2003). While these authors directly motivate their selection model
in terms of the (inclusive) value of sets of alternatives, the model presented here
motivates the way in which these inclusive values determine the pre-selected sets in
terms of cost constrained optimization. This model can also be seen as an alternative
to the selection model of Gaynor et al. (2016). In their model, the distance metric
that defines the size of the pre-selected set is specified as a fixed distance from the
alternative with maximal utility. The model of this paper can be interpreted instead
as distance measured in terms of Kullback-Leibler divergence.40 In the context
of incomplete and asymmetric information, this information theoretic measure has
particular intuitive appeal.
The econometrician cannot observe the ranking of the alternatives included in
J ai . From the inequalities C-5 provided in the Appendix, the set {µij}j∈J ai must
satisfy the necessary condition for inclusion of the jth alternative, so that
G(J ai ;αi, C) =
{{µij}j∈J ai : U(αi, µi) ≤ c(z) ≤ U(αi, µi)} (C-4)
Pr(J ai ;C) = Pr (G(J ai ;αi, C)) .
To the extent that µij = µ
c
ij + µ
a
ij is correlated with ζij through µ
c
ij, i.e. to the
extent that µcij is non-zero with positive probability, observing J ai is informative
39Mapping the present setting onto the framework in Pakes et al. (2011), the agent level un-
observable ξij = ξ
c
ij corresponds to their ν1 terms, while the econometrician level unobservable
µij = µ
c
ij + µ
a
ij corresponds to their ν2 terms.
40For example, ∆i is the KL divergence between the distributions induced by {Pr(Yij |J ai ), j ∈
J ai } and {Pr(Yij |J ), j ∈ J )}, respectively.
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about ζij, so that Φ(αi, C) = E[ζij|G(J ai ;αi, C)] accounts for pre-selection in this
model. Just as in linear models with sample selection (Heckman (1976)), omission
of such selection terms will yield biased and inconsistent estimates. The selection
term here does not permit a closed-form solution and needs to be simulated. Details
on simulation assisted estimation are provided in appendix C.3.
The contribution of patient i to the likelihood function is then given by
Pr
(
Y pij = 1|J ai
)
Pr(J ai ;C),
where
Pr
(
Y pij = 1|J ai
)
=
exp (δij + Φ(αi, C))∑
k∈J ai exp (δik + Φ(αi, C))
.
C.2.3 Details on Bounds in GP Pre-Selection Model
Recall that the solution to the GP’s optimization problem C-2 is to order the alter-
natives in J according to their indirect utilities,
exp
(
αi(1:J) + µi(1:J)
σ
)
= exp
(
xc
′
i(1:J)θc + x
a′
(1:J)θa + µi(1:J)
σ
)
≥ · · ·
≥ exp
(
αi(J :J) + µi(J :J)
σ
)
= exp
(
xc
′
i(J :J)θc + x
a′
(J :J)θa + µi(J :J)
σ
)
(C-5)
and to include the ones up to the point that
Jai = arg max
h∈{1,··· ,J}
{
ln
(
h∑
k=1
exp
(
αi(k:J) + µi(k:J)
σ
))
− ln
(
h−1∑
m=1
exp
(
αi(m:J) + µi(m:J)
σ
))
≥ c(z)
}
= arg max
h
− ln
1− exp
(
αi(h:J)+µi(h:J)
σ
)
∑h
m=1 exp
(
αi(m:J)+µi(m:J)
σ
)
 ≥ c(z)

This yields an upper bound U(αi, µi) on cost which is given by the increment to the
inclusive value of J ai by the marginal included hospital,
U(αi, µi) = ln
 Jai∑
k=1
exp
(
αi(k:J) + µi(k:J)
σ
)− ln
Jai −1∑
m=1
exp
(
αi(m:J) + µi(m:J)
σ
) .
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This also implies that
− ln
1− exp
(
αi(k:J)+µi(k:J)
σ
)
∑Jai
m=1 exp
(
αi(m:J)+µi(m:J)
σ
)
 ≥ c(z) for k = 1, · · · , Jai .
Similarly,
Jai + 1 = arg min
h
− ln
1− exp
(
αi(h:J)+µi(h:J)
σ
)
∑h+1
m=1 exp
(
αi(m:J)+µi(m:J)
σ
)
 ≤ c(z)

implies a lower bound U(αi, µi) on cost which is given by the increment to the
inclusive value of J ai by the marginal excluded hospital,
U(αi, µi) = ln
Jai +1∑
k=1
exp
(
αi(k:J) + µi(k:J)
σ
)− ln
 Jai∑
m=1
exp
(
αi(m:J) + µi(m:J)
σ
) .
Also, for any j 6∈ J ai ,
− ln
1− exp (αij+µijσ )
exp
(αij+µij
σ
)
+
∑
m∈J ai exp
(
αi(m:J)+µi(m:J)
σ
)
 ≤ c(z).
C.3 Details on Estimation
The lower and upper bounds U(αi, µi) and U(αi, µi) of cost implied by the GP
level pre-selection model depend on estimable parameters (θc, θ
a) - coefficients on
distance, waiting time, MFF and HSMR - via αi, and on errors µi = {µij, j ∈ J }
which are unobserved by the econometrician. This is summarized in the columns
labelled “GP” and “econometrician” in Table 5.
The unobservables µi induce the probability of observing the pre-selected set J ai
out of the GP’s consideration set J . And ensemble of such probabilities constitutes
the likelihood function of (θc, θ
a), given the collection of observed pre-selected sets.
The probabilities associated with the observed preselected sets are analytically
intractable, i.e. the model does not permit a closed form expression for them. There-
fore, they need to be simulated, i.e. replaced by simulated approximations. And
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consequently, instead of estimating the parameters (θc, θ
a) and the parameters of
the cost function (i.e. the coefficients on z in c(z)) by maximizing the log-likelihood
function, they must be estimated by maximizing the simulated log-likelihood func-
tion (maximum simulated likelihood, MSL, estimation).
In order to simulate the probabilities of the observed pre-selected sets, 100 stan-
dard normal draws for each hospital j in a GP’s consideration set J are obtained
and retained throughout the estimation. For each candidate value of the parameters,
the values αij + µij are computed and ranked in descending order.
Refer to a consistent simulation sample draw as one for which the simulated
values αij + µij for j ∈ J ai are the highest in the ranking of the J alternatives
and the implied bounds hold. The fraction of consistent simulation sample draws,
out of the 100 draws, is a simulation estimator of the probability of observing the
set J ai . The SML estimation methodology uses these to build up the simulated
log-likelihood function and maximizes it over the parameter space.
The consistent simulation sample draws are retained and constitute estimates
of residual hospital quality at the GP level. They averages, at the hospital level
for each GP, are used as regressors in the second stage choice model for that GP’s
patients.
C.4 Effect of Attribute Changes on Pre-Selected Sets
Let jm denote the marginal included hospital alternative, and let je denote the
marginal excluded hospital alternative.
The GP pre-selection problem, as set out in section C.1, implies that
ln
∑
j∈J ai
exp
(vij
σ
)− ln
 ∑
j∈J ai \{jm}
exp
(vij
σ
) ≥ c(z) (C-6)
ln
 ∑
j∈J ai ∪{je}
exp
(vij
σ
)− ln
∑
j∈J ai
exp
(vij
σ
) < c(z). (C-7)
The interpretation of C-6 is that the contribution of the marginally included hospital
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jm to the inclusive value of the the pre-selected set J a exceeds the cost of including
an alternative.41 And C-7 means that the contribution of the marginally excluded
hospital je is less than that cost.
Note that
ln
∑
j∈J ai
exp
(vij
σ
)− ln
 ∑
j∈J ai \{jm}
exp
(vij
σ
) = − ln(1− exp (vijmσ )∑
j∈J ai exp
(vij
σ
)) ,
(C-8)
and similarly,
ln
 ∑
j∈J ai ∪{je}
exp
(vij
σ
)−ln
∑
j∈J ai
exp
(vij
σ
) = − ln(1− exp (vijeσ )∑
j∈J ai ∪{je} exp
(vij
σ
)) ,
(C-9)
Suppose a hospital attribute of hospital j changes, e.g. its waiting time increases.
Then, three cases can arise.
First, hospital j can be an infra-marginal hospital. In that case, if the change is
small enough in order not to affect the hospital ranking, then it follows from C-8 that
the contribution of the marginal hospital to the inclusive value of the pre-selected
set increases, so that this tends to enlarge the pre-selected set.
Second, if hospital j is (or becomes) the marginal hospital, then again C-8 implies
that this change diminishes the contribution of the marginal hospital to the inclusive
value of the pre-selected set. Hence, in this case the change tends to decrease the
size of the pre-selected set.
Third, if hospital j is the excluded hospital, then this change is irrelevant for the
pre-selected set because it further diminishes the value of the excluded alternative.
If, on the other hand, hospital j’s attribute improves, i.e. its waiting time de-
creases, for example, then this change tends to decrease the size of the pre-selected
set if hospital j is infra-marginal - the contribution of the marginal hospital is smaller
-, or increase it if hospital j is the marginal hospital or initially excluded.
41Recall that the inclusive value of the pre-selected set J a is given by ln
(∑
j∈J a exp
( vij
σ
))
.
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